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ABSTRACT 
 
Can media have any influence on firm performance? Do firms in countries with more independent 
media perform better than firms with less independent media? This paper seeks to answer these 
questions and aims to document the relationship between media independence and firm 
performance in emerging markets. Using a dataset from twenty-four emerging markets, we show a 
significantly positive relationship between media independence and firm performance. We argue 
that independent media reduces information asymmetries for stock market participants. 
Consequently, it becomes hard for managers to expropriate, thereby improving performance of 
firms. We also show that the relationship between media independence and firm performance is 
more pronounced in firms that have higher agency problem. For instance, our results show 
stronger impact of media independence on firms with no dividend payouts, no analyst coverage, 
concentrated ownership, and higher level of operational complexity. It shows that media can play 
a substitute for traditional governance mechanisms in emerging markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
hy do firms headquartered in certain countries outperform similar firms headquartered in certain 
other countries? Is performance a function of the extent of agency problems present within a firm? 
Given the relationship between agency problems and firm performance, the answers to the above 
questions have formed the basis for plentiful of prior literature (Mitton, 2002; Johnson et al., 2000). Most of this 
literature revolves around understanding how firm-specific and country-specific proxies for agency problems; i.e., 
corporate governance mechanisms, effect firm performance. Johnson et al. (2000), for example, show that country-
specific measures of corporate governance are positively related to firm performance in emerging markets. They 
argue that firms headquartered in poor governance environments have a higher likelihood of being expropriated by 
managers/controlling shareholders. As a result, they do not perform as well as firms headquartered in better 
governance environments. In another related study, Mitton (2002) documents significantly better stock price 
performance for firms associated with better firm-specific measures of corporate governance. He shows that firms 
with higher disclosure quality (ADRs and auditors from big-six accounting firms) and higher outside ownership 
concentration outperform other firms. An important factor that has been overlooked in the prior literature is how 
independence of media – country-specific proxy for information asymmetry – affects performance of firms. 
Media is a channel through which information is communicated and disseminated to a wider audience. Effective and 
independent media plays an important role in reducing information asymmetries by making people aware of the 
events happening around them. Consequently, an independent media addresses the principal-agent problem and 
establishes a process of accountability for forces in power. Given media’s role in reducing information asymmetry, 
it is worthwhile to see whether it impacts firm performance or not. This paper is an attempt to fill the gap by 
documenting the relationship between the two. 
 
This paper argues that one of the channels via which media independence exercises its influence on firm 
performance is through its impact on information environment of a firm. Our conjecture is consistent with prior 
W 
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literature that relates media independence with better governance and disclosure mechanisms. Prior literature 
documents a strong link between media independence and governance environment of a firm. Dyck and Zingales 
(2002), for instance, consider media as an important channel via which external stakeholders can pressurize 
managers and directors to act in the best interest of shareholders. In another related study, Kahan and Rock (2007) 
come to the same conclusion when they show that media pressure is an important enabling tool that can force firms 
to adopt good governance practices. Dyck et al. (2007) argue that coverage of misconducts of management in media 
increases the probability that these misconducts will be stopped. This strand of literature identifies a couple of 
channels via which media plays its disciplining role, the most important being its effect on reputation of managers 
and firms. Fama (1980) argues that manager’s future wages are an increasing function of shareholders’ and future 
employers’ beliefs about whether a manager will attend to their interests in situations where they cannot be 
monitored. Fama and Jensen (1983) note that the concerns regarding future monetary consequences can lead 
managers to act in the best interest of shareholders. For reputational concerns to reduce expropriation, the 
information about unscrupulous behavior of management must be publicized in the media. Prior literature highlights 
a number of examples when media attention resulted in disciplining managers. SK Telecom, for example, is an 
interesting case where media campaign not only helped in stopping expropriation, but also forced the firm to 
improve its corporate governance practices. In another case, the Board of Directors of Sears & Roebuck succumbed 
to the ad campaign launched against their inappropriate behavior (Monks and Minnow, 1995).  
 
Consistent with prior literature, this paper argues that firms headquartered in countries with more 
independent media should have better governance environments than similar firms headquartered elsewhere. As a 
result, these firms should outperform firms headquartered in countries with less independent media. Our arguments 
are consistent with prior literature that shows a strong link between firm performance and its governance 
environment. Lemmon and Lins (2003), for example, show that stock returns of firms in which managers have a 
high level of control rights, but lower cash flow ownership, are significantly lower than other firms. In another 
related study, Gompers et al. (2003) find that stock returns of firms with strong shareholder rights outperform 
returns of firms with weak shareholder rights. These studies argue that better governance practices minimize agency 
problems and do not allow managers to expropriate. Consequently, performance of the firms goes up. Consistent 
with our expectations, this paper documents a significantly positive relationship between media independence and 
firm performance in a large dataset from twenty-four emerging markets. Our results show that for every unit 
increase in media independence, firm performance goes up by 0.4430 basis points. We argue that countries with 
more independent media have better information environment than countries with less independent media. As a 
result, firms headquartered in countries with more independent media have lower agency problems. Eventually, 
lower agency problems translate into better performance of these firms. 
 
In addition, we also show that media is more important in determining performance of firms that have 
higher agency conflicts. For example, our results show a significantly positive impact of media independence on 
performance of firms that pay no dividends. No dividend payout is considered as a proxy for poor governance 
because it indicates that managers may have more cash at hand to expropriate or to expense on unprofitable projects 
(Jensen, 1986). Our results show that for every unit increase in media independence, firm performance goes up by 
0.7537 basis points for these firms. We argue that media acts as a substitute for traditional governance mechanisms 
for these firms. In contrast to firms that pay no dividends, our results show no impact of media independence on 
performance of firms that pay dividends. Furthermore, our results show that every unit increase in media 
independence causes firm performance to go up by 0.4430 basis points for a group of firms with analyst coverage 
and 2.0696 basis points for a group of firms without analyst coverage. No analyst coverage is an indication of poor 
information environment or lower investor interest. Therefore, these firms are supposed to have higher agency 
problems (Chung and Jo, 1996; Chen and Steiner, 2000). This result also indicates that media can act as a substitute 
for traditional governance mechanisms. Consistent with previous results, we show that media significantly 
influences performance of firms with concentrated ownership and firms with high operational complexity. Both of 
these groups are supposed to have higher agency problems. Our results show that for every unit increase in media 
independence, performance of concentrated ownership firms goes up by 0.6509 basis points and performance of 
high operational complexity goes up by 0.4393 basis points. In contrast to these firms, our results show no impact of 
media independence on performance of firms with dispersed ownership and firms with lower operational 
complexity. These results further support our claim that media can act as a substitute for traditional governance 
mechanisms in emerging markets. 
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DATA 
 
This paper documents the relationship between media independence and firm performance in twenty-four 
emerging stock markets from various parts of the world. The sample contains emerging markets from Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela), Asia-Pacific (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines), South Asia (India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), Europe (Israel, Turkey, Greece, 
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia), and Africa (South Africa). The sample period for this study is 1999. 
The choice of sample period is driven by the availability of data regarding media independence. We describe our 
dataset in the following subsections. 
 
Media Independence 
 
We measure media independence (MEDIA) by the average proportion of market share of private entities in 
TV and press within a certain country. The data for the proportion of market share of private entities in TV and press 
is obtained from Shleifer et al. (2003). We use the data provided by Shleifer et al. (2003) to construct a measure for 
media independence as follows. Farooq and Dandoune (2012) also used the same measure to document the 
relationship between media independence and dividend policies in emerging markets: 
 








 Pressin entities private of sharemarket  of Proportion
 TV in entities private of sharemarket  of Proportion
2
1
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We believe that if ownership of media is concentrated in the hands of governments, there is a lower 
likelihood that it will provide objective and credible information. A state-owned media is usually more inclined to 
distort and manipulate information to benefit politicians, prevent voters and consumers from making informed 
decisions, and ultimately undermine the markets. Waisboard (1995), while studying the role of media in Latin 
America, documents that government officials benefit more from state-controlled media than the public. We believe 
that private ownership of media results in provision of alternative views to the public, thereby enabling them to 
choose among alternatives. It is in contrast to state ownership where only single view is presented to audience. 
Shleifer et al. (2003), our source of data on media independence, study patterns of media ownership in 97 countries 
and show that countries that are poorer, more autocratic, and have higher levels of state intervention in the economy 
also have greater state ownership of the media. They also show that countries with greater state ownership of the 
media have a less-free press, inferior governance, and less-developed capital markets. Moreover, we argue that 
private ownership allows for competition among media firms, thereby ensuring that the public will get unbiased and 
accurate information. Failing to act responsibly or colluding may harm media’s credibility and profitability in the 
long run. Table 1 documents media independence in each country. The results show that Mexico, Peru, and Turkey 
are the countries with the most independent media. These countries have a media that is completely owned by 
private sector. Our results also show that South Africa has the least independent media with only 35% of the media 
in the hands of private sector. These results must have changed by now due to privatization and deregulation of 
media in most of the emerging markets. 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics For Media Independence 
Countries Media Independence 
Argentina 98.00 
Brazil 94.50 
Chile 70.50 
Colombia 86.50 
Czech Republic 83.00 
Greece 80.00 
Hungary 90.00 
India 56.00 
Indonesia 81.00 
Israel 82.00 
South Korea 61.50 
Malaysia 56.50 
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Mexico 100.00 
Pakistan 50.00 
Peru 100.00 
Philippines 69.50 
Poland 71.50 
Russia 44.50 
South Africa 35.00 
Sri Lanka 45.00 
Taiwan 68.50 
Thailand 70.00 
Turkey 100.00 
Venezuela 98.50 
 
Firm Performance 
 
This paper measures performance of a firm by the market-adjusted returns (RET). The market-adjusted 
returns are the difference between stock returns and market returns. Stock prices and market index are used to 
calculate the market-adjusted returns. We extract the stock price data and the corresponding market index data from 
Datastream. The stock price data and the market index data were obtained for the first and last days of our sample 
period to compute the market-adjusted returns. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper aims to test whether media independence is related to a firm’s performance or not. In order to 
answer this question, we estimate a cross-sectional regression with firm performance (RET) as a dependent variable 
and media independence (MEDIA) as an independent variable. For the purpose of completeness, we also include 
industry dummies (IDUM) and region dummies (RDUM) in our regression equation. It is important to mention here 
that our construction of media variable (MEDIA) is such that we have unique value of media ownership for almost 
every country in the sample (except Thailand and Peru where 100% of media is in the hands of private entities). As 
a result, it is not possible to include country dummies. Therefore, we include region dummies to account for any 
effects specific to the geography of the firm. We classified our firms to be located in five regions; namely, Latin 
America, Asia-Pacific, South Asia, Africa, and Europe. However, due to the presence of only one country in Africa, 
we combined Europe and Africa into one region. Our basic regression equation takes the following form: 
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Mindful of the effects that firm-specific characteristics may have on firm performance, we also add a 
couple of firm-specific variables in our regression equation. For example, larger firms generate more interest from 
stock market participants and therefore have a better information environment. As a result, they may have better 
performance. Therefore, we add log of firm’s market capitalization (SIZE) to capture the effect of size on 
performance. We also add total debt to total asset ratio (LEVERAGE) to capture the effect of leverage on firm 
performance. High-leverage firms have higher bankruptcy risk and therefore have lower performance. Similarly, 
earnings per share (EPS) and sales growth (GROWTH) were added to control for the effect of profitability and 
growth opportunities on firm performance. Profitable firms and firms with high growth opportunities tend to have 
better stock price performance. Our modified regression equation takes the following form. 
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The results of our analysis are reported in Table 2. Our results show that firms headquartered in countries 
with more independent media perform significantly better than firms headquartered in countries with less 
independent media. We report significantly positive coefficient of MEDIA for both equations. Our results from 
Equation (3) – the most comprehensive equation – show that for every unit increase in media independence, returns 
go up by 0.4430 basis point. We argue that firms headquartered in countries with more independent media have 
better information environment than firms headquartered in countries with less independent media. Therefore, these 
firms – those headquartered in countries with relatively more independent media – have lower agency problems. 
Consequently, there is lower likelihood of expropriations in these firms, thereby resulting in performance that is 
better than otherwise similar firms headquartered in countries with less independent media. 
 
Table 2:  Relationship Between Media Independence And Firm Performance 
 Equation (1) Equation (2) 
MEDIA 0.6464*** 0.4430** 
   
SIZE  0.0375*** 
LEVERAGE  0.0002 
EPS  -0.0016*** 
GROWTH  -0.0001 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Region Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. Of Observation 3044 2068 
F-value 9.35 5.30 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.033 
NOTE: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% significance 
level by***. 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Some of the important questions that arise are:  
 
1. Independent media is more effective for which firms? Is it for firms that already have better information 
environments or is it for those that have higher information asymmetries?  
 
2. Does independent media compliment a governance environment or substitute for a governance 
environment?  
 
We aim to answer these questions by re-estimating Equation (3) for sub-samples representing different 
governance and information regimes. 
 
Media Independence And Firm Performance Under Different Dividend Policies 
 
For the purpose of this paper, we define dividend policy by a firm’s decision whether or not to pay 
dividends.  Prior literature considers dividend policy as a mechanism via which firms can reduce agency problems. 
Grossman and Hart (1980), for instance, argue that high dividend payouts alleviate agency conflicts through the 
reduction of free cash flow available to managers. In another related study, Jensen (1986) concludes that high payout 
ratio can lessen the agency costs by reducing free cash flow that could be expensed on unprofitable projects. This 
strand of literature argues that paying high dividends reflects management’s good faith and signals lower agency 
problems. Our results from re-estimation of Equation (3) are reported in Table 3. Our results show that media has no 
impact on firm performance for a sample of firms that pay dividends. We report insignificant coefficient of MEDIA 
for this group. However, we show a significantly positive impact of media independence on performance of firms 
that pay no dividends. We report significantly positive coefficient of MEDIA for this group. Our results show that 
for every unit increase in media independence, firm performance goes up by 0.7537 basis points for this group. Our 
results indicate that where information asymmetries are already low, media does not have any value-enhancing 
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impact. However, it acts as a substitute for traditional governance mechanisms for firms that do not have a better 
governance environment. 
 
Table 3:  Relationship Between Media Independence And Firm Performance Under Different Dividend Policies 
 Firms With Dividends Firms Without Dividends 
MEDIA 0.3178 0.7537** 
   
SIZE 0.0251** 0.0350** 
LEVERAGE 0.0002 0.0009 
EPS -0.0019*** -0.0010 
GROWTH 0.0006 -0.0008 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Region Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. Of Observation 1276 792 
F-value 2.53 6.89 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.114 
NOTE: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% significance 
level by***. 
 
Media Independence And Firm Performance Under Different Levels Of Analyst Coverage 
 
Financial analysts are the agents that provide an independent assessment of a firm’s performance beyond 
what is provided in financial statements. They constantly upgrade their assessments by unearthing new information 
about the firms. We argue that analysts help discipline managers because the market closely monitors forecasts and 
recommendations issued by them. As a result, the extent to which firms are mismanaged is likely to be lower for 
firms that are closely monitored by analysts (Chung and Jo, 1996; Chen and Steiner, 2000). On the other hand, when 
such monitoring is absent, managers may be more likely to pursue activities that benefit themselves at the expense 
of shareholders. In order to test whether the extent of analyst coverage affects the relationship between media 
independence and firm performance, we divide our sample into two groups – one with analyst coverage and the 
other without analyst coverage. We re-estimate Equation (3) for both groups and report our results in Table 4. As 
was the case before, we show that the relationship between media and firm performance is stronger in a group of 
firms with higher information asymmetries. We report a coefficient estimate of 0.4430 for a group of firms with 
analyst coverage and 2.0696 for a group of firms without analyst coverage. We argue that media acts as a substitute 
for governance mechanisms in a sample of firms with higher agency problems; i.e., firms without analyst coverage. 
 
Table 4:  Relationship Between Media Independence  
And Firm Performance Under Different Levels Of Analyst Following 
 Firms With Analyst Coverage Firms Without Analyst Coverage 
MEDIA 0.4430** 2.0696*** 
   
SIZE 0.0375*** 0.0198 
LEVERAGE 0.0002 0.0014 
EPS -0.0016*** 0.0014 
GROWTH -0.0001 0.0005 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Region Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. Of Observation 2068 736 
F-value 5.30 5.75 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.127 
NOTE: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% significance 
level by***. 
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Media Independence And Firm Performance Under Different Ownership Structures 
 
Prior literature considers ownership structure as an important governance device. Concentrated ownership 
structures provide managers and controlling shareholders with means to evade effective disclosure of information 
(Leuz et al., 2003). Poor information disclosure exacerbates information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders 
and result in agency problems. Prior literature also suggests that high ownership concentration creates an 
entrenchment problem that allows controlling shareholders’ self-dealings to go unchallenged by boards of directors. 
On the other hand, dispersed ownership structures reduce some of these agency problems by taking away powers 
from managers and insiders. In order to test whether ownership structure affects the relationship between media 
independence and firm performance, we divide our sample into two groups – one with concentrated ownership and 
the other with dispersed ownership. We define concentrated ownership as the case where insiders hold more than 
50% of the shares and dispersed ownership as the case where insiders do not hold absolute majority. We re-estimate 
Equation (3) for both groups and report our results in Table 5. As was expected, we show no relationship between 
media independence and firm performance for dispersed ownership firms. Our results show insignificant coefficient 
of MEDIA for this group. On the other hand, our results for firms with concentrated ownership show a significant 
impact for media independence on firm performance. We show a significantly positive coefficient of MEDIA for 
this group. Our results show that for every unit increase in media independence, firm performance goes up by 
0.6509 basis points for this group. As was mentioned before, we argue that media independence can play a 
governance role for firms where agency problems are high. 
 
Table 5:  Relationship between Media Independence and Firm Performance under Different Ownership Structures 
 Concentrated Ownership Dispersed Ownership 
MEDIA 0.6509*** -0.4358 
   
SIZE 0.0405*** 0.0509** 
LEVERAGE -0.0001 0.0011 
EPS -0.0011** -0.0029*** 
GROWTH -0.0002 0.0004 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Region Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. Of Observation 1671 396 
F-value 4.91 3.46 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.089 
NOTE: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% significance 
level by***. 
 
Media Independence And Firm Performance Under Different Levels Of Operational Complexity 
 
Operational complexity of a firm intensifies agency problems and lowers information transparency. Prior 
literature maintains that operational complexity allows a broader scope to management for control (Abdel-Khalik, 
1993). This strand of literature indicates that an increasing amount of complexity gives rise to moral hazard 
problems between the managers/controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Knechel et al. (2008) argues 
that operational complexity eventually leads to manipulation of information by managers/controlling shareholders 
and thus increasing agency problems. We measure operational complexity by the ratio of salary expense to total 
operating expenses (Knechel et al., 2008). Consistent with our expectations, we document insignificant impact of 
media independence on firm performance for a sample of firms with low operational complexity and significantly 
positive impact of media independence on firm performance for a sample of firms with high operational complexity. 
Our results show that for every unit increase in media independence, firm performance goes up by 0.4393 basis 
points for this group. 
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Table 6:  Relationship Between Media Independence  
And Firm Performance Under Different Levels Of Operational Complexity 
 High Complexity Low Complexity 
MEDIA 0.4393** 0.1714 
   
SIZE 0.0305*** 0.0559*** 
LEVERAGE -0.0001 0.0001 
EPS -0.0020*** -0.0007 
GROWTH -0.0002 0.0009 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Region Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. Of Observation 1727 341 
F-value 5.00 4.14 
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.066 
NOTE: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% significance 
level by***. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper explores the relationship between media independence and firm performance in twenty-four 
emerging markets from Latin America, Asia-Pacific, South Asia, Africa, and Europe. Our results show a positive 
relationship between media independence and form performance. We show that firms headquartered in countries 
with relatively more independent media perform significantly better than firms headquartered in countries with 
relatively less independent media. We argue that firms from countries with relatively more independent media have 
better information environment than their counterpart firms from countries with relatively less independent media. 
As a result, it is hard for managers to expropriate, thereby increasing firm performance in countries with relatively 
more independent media. Our results also show that media independence is more important for firms with higher 
agency problems. For example, we show stronger impact of media independence on firms with no dividend payouts, 
no analyst coverage, concentrated ownership, and higher level of operational complexity. It shows that media can 
play a substitute for traditional governance mechanisms in emerging markets. 
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